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WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
that he believed the property to have been abandoned. The court
held that, although this statement could not be admitted as a con-
fession of guilt, it, however, in essential details contradicted the
defendant's testimony as to certain essential matters and there was
no error in reading the statement to the jury. Also see, State v.
Sheppard, 49 W. Va. 582, 39 S.E. 676 (1901), where the court dis-
tinguished between an admission and confession, but held that an
extra-judicial admission voluntarily made was admissible.
In the principal case, the defendant denied having made cer-
tain statements contained in the writing. The West Virginia court
dealt with this question in State v. Kinney, supra, where it held
that, if the accused denies that he executed the written statement,
then it is competent evidence for him to contradict the statement;
however, the whole evidence, that is, the statement and the con-
tradictory testimony should go to the jury.
It is therefore submitted that the label which is applied to
such statement is unimportant when the introduction of the evidence
has the same effect. The problem in the principal case is merely
one of semantics, and the court correctly recognized that it makes
no difference what the statement is called. Comment, 39 Mmni. L.
REv. 902 (1955).
J. E. J.
EVDENCE-ADoPTIVE ADNMIssIoNs-FALUIm= To DENY INCRIMINA-
TORY STA.rEmENT MADE iN PREsENCE OF AccusEr.-D was convicted
of murdering his wife. The prosecution's evidence included testi-
mony of a witness received by the court on the basis of adoptive
or implied admission by D. The witness stated that he had asked
D's father, who was in the room in which D was seated, what D
said when he came over to the parents' home after the wife's death.
Witness stated that the father replied D said, "I killed Jeannette,"
and that D did not make any denial of or other challenge to this
statement. D's motion to strike this testimony was denied by the
court. Held, that denial of D's motion to strike the statement was
reversible error since the facts did not disclose that there were cir-
cumstances present which called for a denial by D. Arpan v. United
States, 260 F.2d 649 (8th Cir. 1958).
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The principal case presented the problem of the admissibility
of an incriminatory statement made in the presence of the accused
which was not contradicted or denied by the accused. The rules of
evidence recognize admissions which are implied from conduct,
such as by silence in the face of an accusation of crime, which indi-
cates a consciousness of guilt Mudd v. Cline Ice Cream Co., 101
W. Va. 11, 13, 131 S.E. 865, 866 (1926); Reall v. Deiriggi, 127 W.
Va. 662, 34 S.E.2d 253 (1945); 2 WcMORE, EvmENcE § § 292, 1071,
1072 (3d ed. 1940).
The court in the principal case took the position that the facts
as stated in the record, that the witness was undertaking to hold a
private conversation with D's parent and that D was sitting on the
far side of the room in a state of shock or depression, were circum-
stances which in their normal implication did not present a situation
naturally requiring D to respond to some statement which might
have drifted to his hearing.
• In so holding the court adhered to a policy which has required
the prosecution to show that the accusatory statement has met all
the conditions necessary to give it capacity as an adoptive admission.
The burden is not on the accused to show the impropriety of the evi-
dence merely because it prima facie appears that it was made in his
presence or hearing. Anderson v. State, 171 Miss. 41, 156 So. 645
(1984). 4 WGMOBE, EVwENCE §1071.
The court noted the general rule that, when a statement which
tends to incriminate one accused of committing a crime is made in
his presence and hearing and such statement is not denied by him,
both the statement and the fact of his failure to object are admissible
as evidence showing his assent to its truth. Sparf v. United States,
156 U.S. 51 (1895). This is true, however, only if the statement
was made under such circumstances as would warrant the inference
that the accused would naturally deny it if he did not acquiesce in
its truth. Egan v. United States, 137 F.2d 869, 880--81 (8th Cir.
1943).
The test for admissibility is whether a reasonable person under
similar circumstances would have felt himself called upon to deny
such statement in the event he did not intend to express acqui-
escence by his failure to so deny. People v. Kozlowski, 368 Ill. 124,
13 N.E.2d 174 (1938).
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The limitations on whether there is a tacit admission by an ac-
cused who remains silent depends on: (1) whether he hears and
understands the statement; (2) whether he comprehends its bear-
ing; and. (3), whether the statement is made under such circum-
stances and by such persons as naturally to call for a denial or reply
by him if he did not intend to admit it. State v. Wilson, 205 N.C.
376, 171 S.E. 388 (1938); Commonwealth v. Kenny, 12 Met. (Mass.)
285, 46 Am. Dec. 672 (1847); McCoPmsicK, EvmENcE 580 (1954);
Note, 29 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1266 (1954).
In the Wilson case, supra at 339, the court said "silence alone, in
the face or hearing of an accusation, is not what makes it evidence of
probative value, but the occasion, colored by the conduct of the ac-
cused or some circumstance in connection with the charge, is what
gives the statement evidentiary weight." Failure to deny the state-
ment may be explainable on some inference other than that of be-
lief in the truth of the statement. People v. Simmons, 28 Cal. 2d 699,
713, 172 P.2d 18, 26 (1946). Caution should be exercised in the re-
ceipt of such evidence, since it is liable to misinterpretation. State v.
Jackson, 150 N. C. 831, 64 S.E. 376 (1909). Obviously, if there is no
showing that the statement was communicated to the accused, as in
the principal case, an adoptive admission does not exist.
The court in the principal case observed that the question of
whether the accused actually heard and understood the incrimina-
tory statement was properly a question for the jury. Thurmond v.
State, 212 Miss. 36, 53 So. 2d 44, 46 (1951); State v. Lambertino, 13
N. J. Misc. 687, 180 Ad. 426 (1935). However, the court determines
preliminary questions of fact as to whether the circumstances of the
offered statement present proper bases for its admission in evidence.
Pulver v. Union Investment Co., 279 Fed. 699, 705 (8th Cir. 1922);
Freidman v. Forest City, 239 Iowa 112, 30 N.W.2d 752 (1948); Mc-
CowiInCx, EviDEN E § 247 (1954).
The majority of the courts have held that both the question
whether the accused heard and understood the statement, and the
question whether it was one calling for a reply by the accused under
the circumstances are for the jury to decide. Commonwealth v. Det-
weiler, 229 Pa. 804, 78 AUt. 271 (1910); Note, 29 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1266,
1279 (1954).
The better procedure would seem to be to keep the question
from the consideration of the jury unless and until the judge has
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found the statement to be admissible. In determining whether the
accused heard and understood the incriminatory statement, the sur-
rounding circumstances and the ability of the accused to hear the
statement are proper matters for the court to consider. Furthermore,
every effort should be made to show how near the defendant was to
the accuser so that it will clearly appear whether the statement was
heard by the defendant. Leaving the question for a jury to decide
would be to permit the jury to hear statements which may be highly
prejudicial to the accused. Note, 29 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1266, 1279
(1954). It is submitted that there should be a more responsible as-
sumption by the trial judge of the duty to decide preliminary ques-
tions of fact, as in the principal case, to determine whether the state-
ment and the accused's conduct in response thereto are admissible in
evidence, in order to better protect the accused against a misinter-
pretation of his silence.
A. G. H.
EvnDENcE-PnonmmoN OF SpousAL TEsTmoNY n CmmNqAL
TRIALS-CoMMON LAw RuLE UPHELD.-D was convicted under the
Mann Act for transportating a girl from Arkansas to Oklahoma for
immoral purposes. D contended that he took the girl on the trip as
an accommodation to her, and not to facilitate her practice of prosti-
tution in Oklahoma. The Mann Act requires immoral purpose as
a dominant motive for conviction, so that this defense, if accepted by
the jury, would have prevented D's conviction. After D's convic-
tion in the state court, he appealed and assigned as grounds that he
was prejudicially affected by the state court allowing his wife to
testify as to her prostitution before and after marriage, and as to her
prostitution in Oklahoma at the time of the alleged act D's convic-
tion was upheld by the United States district court and by the court
of appeals. On certiorari, United States Supreme Court reversed,
refusing to modify the common law rule which forbids one spouse
from testifying for or against the other. The court said that, since
the factual issue of the case depended upon the purpose of the trip,
the testimony of D's wife was prejudicial to him. Hawkins v. United
States, 79 Sup. Ct. 136 (1958).
The principal case represents the latest attempt to modify one
of the most cherished rules of common law, the rule forbidding a
wife to testify against her husband in a criminal trial. 8 WGMOBE,
EvmEc § 2227 (3d ed. 1940). Professor Wigmore and most
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